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Regulation of the Environment and
Natural Resources
Introduction and Overview
On July 9, 2020, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in McGirt v.
Oklahoma. Although the only actual effect of that decision was on Mr. McGirt’s state
court criminal conviction, rendering it invalid in light of the continuing existence of
the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s reservation, the implications of McGirt reverberated
throughout Oklahoma and the nation. By rejecting Oklahoma’s arguments that the
march to statehood had resulted in the implicit disestablishment of the Creek’s
reservation (and, by analogy, those of the neighboring and similarly situated
Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Seminole Nations), Justice Gorsuch’s opinion on
behalf of the Court’s majority reaffirmed that nearly all of eastern Oklahoma remains
Indian Country. The governments of those Five Tribes now face the practical
challenges posed by reclaiming territorial sovereignty mostly denied to them for over
a century.
That work of rebuilding tribal sovereignty poses much difficulty and significant
opportunities. This project, McGirt and the Work of Rebuilding of Tribal Nations: A
Tribal Nation Building Colloquium, is focused on assisting tribal governments and
others in assessing and tackling those challenges. The Colloquium’s thesis best
describes this objective:
…McGirt carr[ies] challenging implications [including] the potential
for important expansions of tribal powers – across broad swaths of
tribal governmental responsibilities. At the same time, a number of
non-tribal governments are sounding alarms that threaten
heightened hostility to tribal sovereignty. Ample evidence exists to
drive home the point that hostility between Tribal governments and
their non-Tribal counterparts seldom serves the interests of either
of their respective citizenry. It will be critical for Tribal leaders and
non-tribal political actors to approach the exercise of Tribal powers
in the post-McGirt era with wisdom and vision founded on facts,
evidence, and sound legal principles.
Therefore, through a series of briefing papers on a variety of topics, the Colloquium
aims to provide “theoretically sound and fact-grounded examples and lessons that
can help to separate the prose from the poetry of Tribal sovereignty and
governance.” This briefing paper does so in the context of environmental regulation
and natural resources.
Environmental regulation and the management of natural resources presents a
number and range of complex legal and policy issues for tribal and non-tribal
decision-makers. This briefing paper aims to assist those facing the thicket of these
issues in eastern Oklahoma by briefly reviewing the relevant legal framework and
4

then focusing on environmental regulation in the context of oil and gas
development, natural resource management in the context of hunting and fishing,
and water rights and the management of water. For each of these issues, the paper
provides the more specific legal framework, assesses risks and opportunities postMcGirt, and offers relevant examples and lessons.

Relevant Legal Principles and Background
Despite its narrow focus criminal jurisdiction, McGirt was never just about Mr.
McGirt’s conviction. Both the State of Oklahoma and a number of amici urged the
Supreme Court to consider the potential practical consequences of recognizing the
Creek Nation’s reservation boundaries. These included the specter of a number of
wide-ranging civil and regulatory impacts, including the possibility that such a
decision could “authorize greater, and potentially exclusive, tribal and federal
regulation over lands, businesses, and energy resource development.”1
The Supreme Court rejected these alleged practical consequences and instead
applied its long-standing precedent requiring express Congress language to
disestablish a reservation.2 In doing so, the Court dismissed concerns over civil and
regulatory jurisdiction as misplaced and not before the Court but noted that it was
proceeding “well aware of the potential for cost and conflict around [those]
jurisdictional boundaries, especially ones that have gone unappreciated for so
long.”3
In the context of regulation over lands, environmental protection, and natural
resources, both the Five Tribes and the State of Oklahoma, as well as their citizens
and local communities, are facing the “potential for [those] cost[s] and conflict[s]
around jurisdictional boundaries.” To support their efforts to avoid or minimize that
potential, this paper begins with a brief overview of the relevant jurisdictional
boundaries.
A. Shifting Jurisdictional Boundaries
The upshot of McGirt is that the reservations of the Five Tribes, which were
established and guaranteed by their treaties with the United States, remain extant.
The legal import of that decision is rooted in federal law, which defines “Indian
country” to include “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation.”4 Therefore, in
determining that the Creek Reservation (and those similarly situated) was not
1

Brief of Amicus Curiae Envtl. Fed. of Oklahoma, Inc. et al., McGirt v. Oklahoma, Case No.
18-9526, 2 (filed on March 20, 2020).
2
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2462 (2020) (“To determine whether a tribe
continues to hold a reservation, there is only one place we may look: the Acts of Congress.”)
3
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2481.
4
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2016).
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diminished or disestablished, the Supreme Court confirmed that all land within the
reservation’s boundaries, regardless of ownership, is Indian Country and, as such,
subject to unique jurisdictional rules, like the Major Crimes Act at issue in McGirt.
Reservation boundaries and the limits of Indian Country have important
consequences for civil and regulatory authority as well. Historically, the Supreme
Court recognized that tribal territories encompassed distinct political communities,
with which the United States entered treaty relations and thereby assumed
important obligations to the exclusion of state interests or authority.5 This general
concept, rooted in the government-to-government relationship expressed through
treaties, is foundational to federal Indian law and remains relevant for understanding
the continuing prohibition of state power over tribes and tribal members within
reservations.6
Over time, however, the bright line rule that states have no power or role in Indian
Country has shifted when it comes to state authority over non-tribal members.
During the allotment era of the late 1800s and early 1900s, for example, the United
States opened reservation lands to settlement and purchase by non-tribal members
and, as a result, many previously intact reservations became “checkerboarded” with
different types of land ownership. As a result, the Supreme Court’s reliance on its
early conception of tribal authority has evolved.
Primarily, this evolution has led the Court to analyze assertions of state authority
over non-tribal members in Indian Country within the context of preemption rather
than simply ask whether such authority would infringe upon tribal sovereignty.7 This
preemption analysis relies upon a judicial balancing of competing federal, tribal, and
state interests, analysis of relevant federal treaties or laws, and moves consideration
of tribal sovereignty as a backdrop against which to conduct that assessment.8
Where such a review determines that federal and tribal interests outweigh the
state’s interest in asserting authority, that state power is preempted.9 In other
instances, however, the Supreme Court has relied on the significance of state
interests, services, and activities to uphold incursions of state power over non-tribal
members in Indian Country.10
In addition, the history of allotment has profoundly impacted the Supreme Court’s
analysis of tribal regulatory authority in Indian Country. Beginning with Montana v.
United States, a case in which the Crow Tribe sought to prohibit non-Indians from
fishing and hunting on non-Indian owned lands within the Tribe’s reservation, Court

5

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832)
See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973); California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214-15 (1987).
7
See, e.g., McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171 (noting that “the [Indian sovereignty] doctrine has
undergone considerable evolution in response to changed circumstances”).
8
See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
9
See, e.g., Id.; New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
10
See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 185-87 (1989).
6
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drastically shifted the jurisdictional analysis from consideration of the reservation’s
exterior boundaries to assessment of individual parcels of land.11 There, relying on
its own review of the allotment era’s policy goals, the Court directly linked the
process of allotment to limitations on tribal regulatory authority, saying that “[i]t
defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-Indians
purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an
avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal
government.”12
Nonetheless, the Montana Court recognized that some tribal authority over nontribal members extends across all lands within Indian Country. Although generally
not the case, the Court cautioned that, “[t]o be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.”13 The Court defined these instances as
follows:
[1] A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or
its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements[; and]
[2] A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.14
This conception of tribal regulatory authority has evolved into a “pathmarking”
establishment of the general “Montana rule” limiting tribal authority and the
“Montana exceptions” recognizing such powers.15 Despite the Montana Court’s
certainty that tribes retain certain powers over non-Indians, even on non-Indian
owned fee land, the Court’s reliance on this test has resulted in recognizing such
authority in only one very limited capacity in the intervening four decades.16
Thus, while far removed for foundational notions of tribal territories as distinct
communities over which a state could have no authority, the intertwined questions
of whether a state (analyzed under a preemption analysis) or a tribe (analyzed under

11

450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Id. at 559 n. 9.
13
Id. at 565.
14
Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
15
See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 329-30
(2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 553 U.S. 353, 358-59 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438, 445-48 (1997); see also McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2502 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
16
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989).
12
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Montana and its progeny) can exercise particular powers have evolved into
complicated, fact-specific legal questions.
B. Other Sources of Tribal Authority
In addition to the evolution of Supreme Court precedent regarding state and tribal
regulatory authority, Congress remains free to define the nature and extent of tribal
and state power in Indian Country.
First, Congress retains authority to both recognize tribal sovereignty and delegate to
tribes additional authority under federal law.17 It has done both through
amendments to a suite of bedrock environmental laws by authorizing tribes to
assume primacy across their reservations for purposes of implementing and
enforcing those laws.18 Importantly, after Congress did so in changes to the Clean
Water Act (CWA), the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA)
initially interpreted that action as a recognition of tribal sovereignty and required
tribes to demonstrate inherent authority (pursuant to Montana) in order to exercise
those powers.19 For a variety of reasons, however, the USEPA has subsequently
reinterpreted the CWA as a delegation of federal power, which obviates the need for
any Montana analysis.20
Second, although the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the rights reserved
by tribes through treaties with the United States when considering the effects of
allotment and applying Montana, those reserved rights remain important bases for
tribal activities and powers. The Supreme Court applies particular rules, known as
the Indian canons of construction, when interpreting treaty reserved rights and, as
the Court found in McGirt, these rules require that such rights be insulated from
diminishment unless Congress has expressly indicated an intent to do so.21 In
addition to McGirt, a spate of recent cases upholding the continuing existence and
exercise of these reserved rights beyond reservation boundaries suggests that the
modern Court is committed to adhering to the canons of construction when
analyzing treaty rights and authorities going forward.22
Third, for over a century, the Supreme Court has recognized and protected tribal
rights to water appurtenant to and necessary to fulfill the purposes of their
reservations. These rights, first determined by the Court in its 1908 decision United
17

See, e.g., United States v. Lara. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
See Tribal Assumption of Federal Laws – Treatment as a State (TAS), UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/tribal/tribal-assumption-federallaws-treatment-state-tas (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
19
See, e.g., State of Montana v. United States Envt’l Protection Agency, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th
Cir. 1998).
20
Environmental Protection Agency, Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal
Provision, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,183 (May 16, 2016).
21
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
22
See, e.g., Washington State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 1000 (2019);
Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S.Ct. 1686 (2019).
18
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States v. Winters,23 establish a federal law basis for tribal claims to water.
Furthermore, although subsequent federal law subjects those claims to adjudication
by state courts,24 their origin in the Congressional acts and treaties setting aside
tribal homelands often ensure they remain senior to claims by competing water
users. Finally, by virtue of their federal status, these rights need not comply with
state law in all respects.25 As a result, the unique status of tribal water rights provide
an additional source of tribal power that often requires additional analysis beyond
the general assessment of jurisdictional boundaries described above.
C. Oklahoma
The preceding overview of federal Indian law is necessary to understand the general
framework within which issues specific to eastern Oklahoma arise. The unique
history of the Five Tribes and various aspects of their relations with both the United
States and the State of Oklahoma are also critical to assessing the challenges and
opportunities posed by McGirt in the areas of environmental regulation and natural
resources. While a detailed historical review is beyond the scope of this paper,26 the
following examples, rooted in treaties and federal laws specific to the Five Tribes and
Oklahoma, are particularly relevant and demonstrate the need to carefully analyze
these unique contexts when considering otherwise applicable principles of federal
Indian law.
As recognized by Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the majority in McGirt, the presentday jurisdictional conflicts are rooted in the evolution of law and policy developed
by and foisted upon the Five Tribes. Particularly relevant to the McGirt decision, for
example, were treaties entered between the United States and the Creek Nation in
the early 1830s, pursuant to which the United States secured the removal of the
Nation in exchange for a “‘permanent home to the whole Creek nation,” … [and a]
promise[ ] that “[no] State or Territory [shall] ever have a right to pass laws for the
government of such Indians, but they shall be allowed to govern themselves.’”27
Similar guarantees or promises of land were made to the other four of the Five
Tribes.28
As with the question of criminal jurisdiction posed in McGirt, the terms of these and
subsequent treaties reserving and protecting lands and reservations for the Five
23

207 U.S. 564 (1908)
43 U.S.C. § 666 (2016).
25
See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1324, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1983).
26
Most readers are likely intimately familiar with this history; however, for additional
background and resources, see COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, §4.07[1][a] at 288310 (Nell Jessup Newton, ed. 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
27
140 S. Ct. at 2459 (citing Treaty with the Creeks, preamble, Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat. 418
(1833 Treaty); Treaty with the Creeks, Art. XIV, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366, 368 (1832
Treaty)).
28
See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, art. V, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478, 481; Treaty with
the Choctaws, art. 4, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, 333-34; Treaty with the Seminoles, March
28, 1833, 7 Stat. 423; Treaty with the Chickasaws, Oct. 20, 1832, 7 Stat. 381.
24
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Tribes have been critical in resolving disputes over ownership of and jurisdiction over
natural resources. In Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, for example, the United States
Supreme Court relied on these treaty promises to the Cherokee, Choctaw, and
Chickasaw to find that the bed and banks of certain navigable waterways passing
through those lands—property that would have otherwise passed to the State of
Oklahoma upon statehood—was granted to and remained in tribal ownership.29 That
result, rooted in these specific treaties, was starkly different than the Court’s
decision in Montana that similar property had not been reserved by the Crow Tribe
and, instead, had transferred to the State of Montana upon statehood.30 Thus, while
the general principles of federal Indian law may be relevant, tribal-specific histories
and treaty language are also critical to any legal issue arising in Indian Country.
The history of allotment in what would become Oklahoma is also important to
understanding and analyzing the post-McGirt landscape. The federal government
pursued allotment of the Five Tribes’ territories in a manner consistent with the
general allotment policy prescribed by the General Allotment Act of 1887 but, unlike
other reservations across much of the country, the territories of the Five Tribes were
excluded from that law.31 Instead, Congress passed additional legislation specific to
the allotment of these tribal lands, including the Curtis Act in 1898, which authorized
allotment generally,32 and subsequent tribe-specific implementing legislation.33
Ultimately, while the Five Tribes and their members have fought to retain individual
allotments, tribal trust lands, and other parcels owned in restricted fee status, the
allotment of their lands resulted in a significant diminution of tribal- and tribal
member-owned lands within their reservations.34 The resulting patterns of
ownership within the reservations of the Five Tribes include lands retained by the
Tribes since their original treaty guarantees,35 lands allotted to individual tribal
members that, whether formally restricted or not, remain owned by the heirs of the
29

397 U.S. 620, 628-31 (1970).
Montana, 450 U.S. at 555 n. 5 (distinguishing the history of removal of the Five Tribes and
the grants of property to them in fee status from the relevant Crow treaties and history).
31
Act of Feb. 8, 1887, § 8, 24 Stat. 391, codified at 25 U.S.C. §339 (2016).
32
Act of June 28, 1898, § 11, 30 Stat. 495, 497; see also McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2465
(discussing the Curtis Act in the context of jurisdiction).
33
See, e.g., An Act to Ratify and Confirm an Agreement with the Muscogee or Creek tribe of
Indians and for other purposes, March 1, 1901, 31 Stat. 861, 862-64.
34
Five Civilized Tribes Allotted Lands, Cherokee Nation GIS doc. no. 4551c (Mar. 1, 2016).
Copy available in author’s files. Importantly, the trust and restricted fee lands retained or
acquired by the Five Tribes within reservation boundaries remained Indian Country
pursuant to federal law regardless of the McGirt decision and recent decisions have
recognized the same for individually owned trust or restricted fee allotments. COHEN’S
HANDBOOK, §4.07[1][b] at 292-94. Thus, the fundamental challenge and possibility posed by
McGirt is the recognition that all of those lands lost through allotment remain Indian
Country and are now subject to broader tribal powers.
35
See, e.g., Indian Country U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967, 976 (10th Cir. 1987)
(analyzing one parcel of land held by the Creek Nation and finding that, “with title dating
back to treaties concluded in the 1830s and patents issued in the 1850s,” such land is the
“purest form of Indian Country.”)
30
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original allottee and for which “title … can be traced directly to the Reservation(s)
granted to [a Tribe] … and [that were] never owned by the State of Oklahoma,”36 and
lands that have passed entirely out of tribal or tribal citizen ownership.37
The loss of tribal- and tribal member-owned lands was compounded after allotment
by additional Congressional legislation addressing the alienability of individual
allotments or parcels of restricted fee lands and expanding Oklahoma’s authority
over the transfer and management of those parcels.38 The Stigler Act of 1947, for
example, limited who could acquire such interests,39 authorized state court
jurisdiction over guardianship, estate, and probate proceedings for members of the
Five Tribes,40 and limited the tax exempt status of those lands.41 Each of these actions
terminated otherwise applicable federal law protections for those interests and, as
a result, trust and restricted allotments continued to pass from tribal hands into nonIndian ownership.42 In addition, as discussed in greater detail below, the Stigler Act
also authorized state regulatory authority over oil and gas operations on the Tribes’
restricted lands, although such authority did not explicitly displace any concurrent
tribal powers and remained subject to federal oversight.43
Finally, even more recent federal legislation focused on the balance of federal, tribal,
and state authorities within the boundaries of Oklahoma may also be relevant. In
2005, for example, Congress required the USEPA to approve an extension of the
State’s regulatory programs into Indian Country upon Oklahoma’s request and
required the State’s agreement as a precondition to the assumption of such
responsibilities by any Tribe.44 As a result of this provision, unlike elsewhere in Indian
Country, the Five Tribes must reach agreement with Oklahoma in order to be
delegated federal authority from USEPA.45 In addition, by virtue of recent, postMcGirt approval from the USEPA Administrator pursuant to this law, Oklahoma

36

See, e.g., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 6, Bosse v. State of Oklahoma, Case No.
CF-2010-213; PCD-2019-124 (Mclain Cty. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 13, 2020)
37
See also D. Faith Olowski and Robbie Emory Burke, Oklahoma Indian Titles, 29 TULSA L. J.
361, 363-67 (2013).
38
See, e.g., Act of Aug. 4, 1947, 61 Stat. 731 (The Stigler Act).
39
Id. at Sec. 1-2, 61 Stat. 731-32.
40
Id. at Sec. 3, 61 Stat. 732.
41
Id. at Sec. 6, 61 Stat. 733.
42
Congress recently amended the law to eliminate the limitations on who could acquire
trust and restricted allotments. See Act of Dec. 31, 2018, Pub. L. 115-399, 132 Stat. 5331.
43
Act of Aug. 4, 1947, Sec. 11, 61 Stat. 731, 734 (“All restricted lands of the Five Civilized
Tribes are hereby made subject to all oil and gas conservation laws of Oklahoma; Provided,
That no order of the Corporation Commission affecting restricted Indian land shall be valid
as to such land until submitted to and approved by the Secretary of the Interior or his duly
authorized representative.”)
44
The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users
(SAFETEA-LU), Aug. 10, 2005, Sec. 10211, Pub. L. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144, 1937.
45
Id. at Sec. 10211(b)(2).
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continues to exercise broad environmental regulatory authority across the Five
Tribes’ reservations.46
These examples are particularly relevant for the specific subject matter areas that
follow but, more broadly, emphasize the need for careful scrutiny of the potential
for unique legal issues related to the Five Tribes within the broader context of federal
Indian law. With that approach in mind, the remainder of this paper focuses on
environmental regulation, with a specific emphasis on oil and gas development;
natural resources management, with a specific focus on hunting and fishing; and the
management of water and water rights.

Environmental Regulation.
The authority to regulate and protect the environment within Indian Country is
primarily governed by two intersecting and overarching legal tests. First, as described
above, the general rules of civil regulatory authority authored by the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court provide the basis for determining whether a tribal or
state government can adopt and enforce environmental laws and regulations.
Second, a suite of federal environmental protection laws authorize the USEPA or, if
approved by the USEPA, either a tribe or state, to develop, implement, and enforce
various environmental rules, including those related to air and water quality and a
host of other issues.47 These two primary standards for analyzing and assessing
environmental regulatory authority in Indian Country are often fact-bound and
complex, requiring an understanding of the specific parties, land, and activity over
which such authority is being asserted. Therefore, this section addresses these issues
by utilizing the specific example of oil and gas development in a post-McGirt eastern
Oklahoma to help guide the discussion.
A. Oil and Gas Development in Indian Country and Oklahoma.
The regulation of oil and gas activity requires a host of interrelated or sequential
actions, from spacing, pooling, and communitization rules and regulations to the
enforcement of health and safety standards during development to the plugging and
abandonment of previously developed wells. The protection and regulation of water

46

Letter from USEPA Administrator Wheeler to Governor J. Kevin Stitt, Re: Approval of State
of Oklahoma Request Under Section 10211(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act of 2005 (Oct. 1, 2020), available at
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2020/10/epa-letter-to-gov.-stitt.pdf [hereinafter
Wheeler letter].
47
See Tribal Assumption of Federal Laws – Treatment as a State (TAS), supra n. 18.
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and air quality from discharges or pollution during such development are also critical
elements of such authority.48
In most instances across Indian Country, the federal government plays an integral
role in these activities by virtue of its trust responsibility and ownership (for the
benefit of tribes) of significant surface and mineral interests. Under federal law,
therefore, various federal agencies are responsible for the leasing, regulation, and
oversight of oil and gas development on such lands.49 In addition, many tribes on
whose reservations oil and gas development is prevalent have adopted their own
legal and regulatory structure to support those federal agencies, whether through
tribal regulatory processes necessary prior to the federal approval of a lease or other
decision or tribal codes addressing other related environmental protections.50 A
number of tribes, including the Cherokee Nation, have also sought the delegation of
additional authority from the USEPA under various federal environmental laws
authorizing such delegations.51 The combination of federal and tribal oversight of oil
and gas development along with tribal environmental laws and protections,
including those relying on delegated federal authority, provide a broad basis of
federal and tribal regulatory authority on many reservations.
Conversely, prior to McGirt, the State of Oklahoma exercised authority over the bulk
of these activities across all of eastern Oklahoma. For example, pursuant to the
Stigler Act described above, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission exercised
concurrent authority over the leasing, spacing, communitization, and
decommissioning of wells on certain restricted lands within the Five Tribes’
reservations.52 As noted by the text of that law, the exercise of that authority is in
conjunction with the federal government’s authority, and the federal government
retains leasing and regulatory authority over those and other restricted or trust lands
of the Five Tribes as well.53

48

Although oil and gas development is a discrete example intended to illustrate and apply
the broader concepts relevant to environmental regulation, the potential environmental
impacts occasioned by such development could be extrapolated to other activities. Also,
this briefing paper does not consider the authority to levy taxes on oil and gas activity,
which is addressed in a separate briefing paper in this series.
49
See, e.g., 25 C.F.R part 211 (2020).
50
See, e.g., MHA Energy, MANDAN, HIDATSA AND ARIKARA NATION,
https://www.mhanation.com/mha-energy (last visited Nov. 27, 2020); Southern Ute
Department of Energy, SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN TRIBE, www.suitdoe.com (last visited Dec. 1,
2020).
51
Tribes Approved for Treatment as a State (TAS), UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/tribal/tribes-approved-treatment-state-tas (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).
52
Act of Aug. 4, 1947, 61 Stat. at 734; Currey v. Corp. Comm’n, 617 P.2d 177 (Okla. 1979),
cert den. 452 U.S. 938, reh. den. 453 U.S. 927 (1981) (upholding state authority to order the
plugging of wells on restricted lands).
53
See, e.g., Leasing of Restricted Lands of Members of Five Civilized Tribes, Oklahoma, For
Mining, 25 C.F.R. Part 213 (2020).
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In addition, in 2013, the Muscogee Creek Nation—expressing a desire to improve
upon the federal government’s regulatory activities—adopted its own tribal law to
regulate oil and gas activities as well.54 Other of the Five Tribes have also adopted
their own environmental laws and developed environmental programs in an effort
to protect their trust and restricted resources as well as their citizens and
communities.55
But, despite those potentially concurrent federal and tribal standards, the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission has been the primary regulator of oil and gas activity within
the Five Tribes’ reservations, even to the detriment of the federal government’s
regulatory authority.56 In addition, since the USEPA Administrator’s approval of
Oklahoma’s petition to extend its delegated environmental authority into the Five
Tribes’ reservation boundaries after McGirt, the State continues to exercise
environmental regulatory authority on essentially the same basis as it did prior to
that decision.57
So, what opportunities for reform or improvement are presented by a post-McGirt
world?

54

Muscogee (Creek) Nation N.C.A. 13-266, available at
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on tribal law outside the scope of any statute administered by EPA. EPA’s decision under
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B. Post-McGirt Opportunities and Risks.
As described above, Indian tribes retain broad power over their lands and members
within Indian Country and assertions of state power over tribes, their lands or
members within Indian Country are, as a general matter, per se invalid unless
authorized by Congress.58 Therefore, with the Supreme Court’s recognition that the
Five Tribes’ reservation boundaries remain, this broad tribal authority and exclusion
of state authority extends to those boundaries, and includes tribal power over
members who may be engaging in activities on non-Indian owned lands.
Beyond the activities of tribal members, the Supreme Court’s Montana test,
including its general rule and two exceptions, has become the guiding legal principle
for determining whether one of the Five Tribes can exercise regulatory control over
non-tribal members on non-Indian owned lands in Indian Country. But, by virtue of
the unique history of Oklahoma, including the various Congressional enactments
related to tribal lands, allotments, and restricted status lands, even determining the
nature of ownership of a particular parcel may be challenging. Unlike in Montana,
where the Supreme Court determined that the Crow Tribe lacked any claim to the
lands at issue, the Five Tribes retain treaty-guaranteed lands—the “purest form of
Indian Country”59—and could potentially assert broader authority, conditioned on
the continuing right to exclude state oversight, over other lands where title has
remained in tribal member ownership and could be traced directly to those original
treaty promises.60 Thus, application of Montana’s general rule limiting tribal
authority is not as straightforward in Oklahoma.
On non-member owned fee lands, however, Montana’s general rule does apply and
tribal authority over a non-member on non-Indian lands is generally disfavored. In
those situations, a tribe must be able to show a consensual relationship with the
non-member or that the non-member’s activities pose a threat or may have an effect
on the tribe’s interests, health, safety, or welfare in order to exercise regulatory
authority.61 The nature of oil and gas development and its corresponding
environmental risks would seem to provide a strong basis for tribal authority under
this second Montana exception; however, while some lower courts have been open
to such claims,62 the Supreme Court has interpreted that exception very narrowly
and suggested that only a catastrophic threat or effect would suffice.63 Even if able
58

McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168; California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at
214-15; but see Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976)
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59
Indian Country U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d at 976.
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non-member fee ownership).
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Montana, 490 U.S. at 565-66.
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See, e.g., FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 942 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2019); Attorney’s
Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 939
(8th Cir. 2010)
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to meet that high standard, doing so would depend upon the specific facts at issue
and likely not provide a broader base of authority necessary for tribal regulatory
authority across all similarly situated actors within the reservation.
Conversely, although Congress has expressly authorized Oklahoma’s authority over
certain oil and gas and environmental regulatory activities, the State may still need
to demonstrate that its authority to regulate elsewhere in Indian Country does not
infringe upon tribal sovereignty and is not pre-empted under the applicable interest
analysis described above.64 As in the Supreme Court’s analysis of these factors in its
Cotton Petroleum and Mescalero Apache Tribe decisions, the outcome would likely
turn upon the nature of the state’s interests in exercising that authority and whether
such state authority would frustrate competing federal and tribal interests. In Cotton
Petroleum, for example, the Court found it persuasive that the State of New Mexico
was directly involved in and supportive of non-Indian oil and gas development
activity in Indian Country.65
While impossible to predict the outcome of any specific conflict, it seems likely that
similar reasoning would be quite persuasive in any dispute over Oklahoma’s
regulatory authority over non-Indians on non-Indian owned land within the Five
Tribes’ reservations, particularly given the history of Oklahoma’s extensive
involvement in environmental regulation and oversight of oil and gas activity and
Congressional expansions of that authority in the Stigler Act and SAFETEA-LU. As with
arguments around tribal authority under Montana, however, these cases and their
resolution may be limited to specific facts and circumstances without providing many
broad, reliable answers to either the Five Tribes or the State of Oklahoma.66 In fact,
where any such conflict may arise, the specific history, chain of title, and ownership
of each parcel of land involved as well as the identity of the parties at issue are likely
to determine the specific boundaries of tribal and state authority. Even where those
boundaries are clearly defined in favor of state or tribal authority in a specific
instance, however, both sovereigns are likely to share authority on a more regional
or reservation-wide basis. And, even if the State or a tribe may have strong
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See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, at § 6.03[2][c], 528-29 (“State jurisdiction and tribal
jurisdiction in Indian country raise two separate legal questions. For example, if application
of the Montana test results in a finding that a tribe lacks jurisdiction over a non-Indian on
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At least one producer has already challenged the OCC’s authority over its operations
within Indian Country. See Decision Sheet of the ALJ, Applicant Calyx Energy III, LLC, Cause
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202001032 through 202001042, Before the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Nov. 25,
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arguments in its favor, the uncertainty, cost, and delay associated with securing a
confirmation of such authority present a dilemma for policy-makers and regulators.
Faced with similar dilemmas and interested in avoiding all-or-nothing jurisdictional
fights, other tribes have developed innovative approaches to oil and gas and
environmental regulation within their reservation boundaries. On the Southern Ute
Indian Reservation in Southwestern Colorado, for example, the jurisdictional
situation is similarly complicated by history, allotment, and conflict between the
Tribe and the State of Colorado. But, in hopes of providing some certainty and
avoiding protracted litigation and uncertainty, the Tribe and its allies persuaded
Congress to enact a law confirming some of the jurisdictional divides within the
Reservation’s boundaries.67
While that legislation limited tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians to the Tribe’s trust
lands,68 it did not resolve the complex situation of state, federal, and tribal regulation
of the development of oil and gas from the various parcels of surface and sub-surface
interests within the Reservation. In an effort to establish guidelines between those
three governments for those regulatory activities, the Tribe, the federal government,
and the State oil and gas regulatory body negotiated and entered an
intergovernmental agreement pursuant to which the parties agreed to disagree
about the extent of their respective authorities but consented to a process for
acknowledging and confirming appropriately rendered decisions of the relevant
state regulatory body.69 Similar intergovernmental agreements address the balance
of regulatory authority on Indian lands and provide a common basis for
communication while reducing potentially duplicative regulatory requirements,70 an
issue already identified as an existing challenge for certain restricted status lands in
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Pub. L. 98-290, 98 Stat. 201 (May 21, 1984), codified at 25 U.S.C. § 668 notes.
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See Section D.4, INTERAGENCY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (Southern Ute
Indian Tribe and Bureau of Land Management) AND INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT (Bureau of
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eastern Oklahoma.71 With that common basis, then, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe
worked to develop its own regulatory capacity and authority to complement that of
its fellow governmental partners.72
In addition, facing similar potential for conflicts and litigation, the Southern Ute
Indian Tribe also developed an innovative approach to environmental regulation.
Working with the State of Colorado, the Tribe “established a six-member
environmental commission to promulgate rules and regulation for reservation air
quality.”73 The intergovernmental agreement to do so envisioned a long-term
collaborative effort to build an air quality program to cover the entire Reservation
and, ultimately, resulted in the Tribe applying for and being granted authority from
the USEPA to administer and regulate air quality, subject to the oversight and
authority of the intergovernmental environmental commission.74 As a result, while
the process of establishing the commission and developing its technical capacity has
taken decades, both the Tribe and the State of Colorado are now able to work
cooperatively to protect the local environment for all of their citizens.
The Gila River Indian Community (GRIC) in Arizona is another example of tribal efforts
to regulate the environment despite jurisdictional complexities. Like Southern Ute,
the GRIC worked to develop a comprehensive air quality management plan and
engaged in a long-term effort to educate and consult with neighboring communities
and non-tribal reservation residents about the GRIC’s plan and efforts to protect air
quality.75 The GRIC also secured treatment-as-state status from USEPA but did not
initially have confirmed authority to levy penalties and enforce them upon non-tribal
operators on the reservation. Nonetheless, the GRIC’s educational and collaborative
efforts preempted any jurisdictional challenges to those early enforcement
activities.76
The lessons offered by Southern Ute and GRIC demonstrate the potential benefits of
long-term cooperative efforts to regulate the environment, particularly for resources
71
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that could result in permanent impacts across jurisdictional boundaries, like oil and
gas development and air and water quality. While the possibility of negotiating and
entering cooperative agreements to address oil and gas or broader environmental
regulations presents a daunting challenge, the fact-specific and limited nature of
Supreme Court precedent and potential litigation may result in similar delays while
still resulting in continued uncertainty.

Natural Resources (Hunting and Fishing)
The complexities associated with environmental regulation mirror those relevant to
the management of natural resources more broadly, including the conservation of
fish and wildlife and the control of hunting and fishing in Indian Country. As with the
analyses of state and tribal authority described in the previous section, tribes
generally retain broad authority over their members and resources while the
Montana test governs tribal authority over non-tribal members on non-Indian
owned lands. Similarly, as demonstrated by New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,77
state authority over non-Indian hunting and fishing within Indian Country is analyzed
by applying the preemption framework.78 Thus, post-McGirt, tribal authority over
tribal members now extends to the exterior boundaries of the Five Tribes’
Reservations and, if litigated, the legal standards for determining tribal or state
authority over non-tribal members on non-Indian owned lands within those
boundaries depend upon facts and contexts specific to individuals and lands
involved. Therefore, as with tribal authority to regulate the environment, the
prevailing narrow view of tribal authority over non-tribal members combined with
the long history of state control over much of this territory may undermine efforts
of the Five Tribes to secure judicial affirmation of their inherent sovereign power to
regulate the use of natural resources by any user anywhere within their
Reservations.79
Prior to McGirt, the Cherokee and Choctaw Nations developed intergovernmental
agreements with the State of Oklahoma to provide a basis on which the citizens of
each Nation could secure hunting and fishing licenses and upon which each Nation
could work cooperatively with Oklahoma to “effectively manage their respective and
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shared resources.”80 While the specific terms and implementation of each of those
compacts differ slightly, both seek to ensure a comprehensive legal and regulatory
scheme for tribal citizens to hunt and fish while recognizing the unique history and
jurisdictional complexities of the Cherokee and Choctaw lands and reservations. The
tribal nations agreed in both compacts to purchase state licenses for their citizens
and to enact legislation consistent with relevant federal laws and comparable to
Oklahoma’s hunting and fishing standards in order to maintain consistency and
comprehensive protections for fish and wildlife.81
Importantly, both Compacts include broad definitions of tribal authority. The
Cherokee Nation’s Compact generally refers to “to the lands, waters, fish, wildlife
and persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Nation,”82 while the Choctaw Nation’s
Compact also specifically defines those lands as “including those lands defined as
‘Indian country’ per 18 U.S.C. § 1151.”83 Thus, post-McGirt, the tribal nations and
Oklahoma could continue to rely upon the terms of these compacts to govern the
regulation of hunting and fishing for tribal citizens anywhere within the exterior
boundaries of the Cherokee and Choctaw Reservations without the need for further
amendment or modification.
But, while these Compacts provide a solid foundation on which to proceed, both
Cherokee and Choctaw—as well as other of the Five Tribes—may wish to revisit the
balance of tribal and state authority represented in those agreements in light of
McGirt. At the very least, for example, the Five Tribes and Oklahoma may need to
reconsider how to effectively regulate and oversee tribal citizens hunting and fishing
within the exterior boundaries of the Five Tribes’ reservations, particularly in light of
the general rule limiting state power over tribes and their members in Indian
Country. Beyond that issue, the Five Tribes and the State of Oklahoma may also want
to consider the regulation of non-tribal members as well as their collective interests
in the conservation and management of shared resources like fish and wildlife. If so,
lessons and examples from elsewhere in Indian Country may be helpful for those
discussions.
The Flathead Reservation of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT) in
Montana is highly checkerboarded and predominantly populated by non-tribal
members owning fee property.84 With regard to the regulation of hunting and
80
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fishing, however, the CSKT retain important rights they reserved in the 1855 Treaty
of Hellgate, which established the reservation, including the “exclusive right of taking
fish in all streams running through or bordering said reservation.”85
Despite that strong, treaty-based right to exclusivity, however, the CSKT and the
State of Montana engaged in lengthy litigation over the nature and extent of the
Tribes’ right to regulate all hunting and fishing (by both tribal members and nonmembers) across the Flathead Reservation.86 Based on this treaty language,
however, the CSKT were able establish their ownership of submerged lands
underlying an important lake on the Reservation and, from that basis of ownership,
distinguish Montana and secure broader regulatory authority, even over non-tribal
members.87
The Tribes then leveraged that authority into regulatory standards that they sought
to apply across the Reservation and began negotiations with the State of Montana
to secure an agreement for doing so.88 Spurred on by additional litigation supporting
the tribal position,89 the State and the Tribes entered into an intergovernmental
agreement regarding hunting and fishing on the Flathead Reservation.
The terms of the State-Tribal Cooperative Agreement Between The Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of The Flathead Reservation and The State of Montana by
and through the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks of The State of Montana
provide for a joint state-tribal wildlife board, the purpose of which is to develop
“cooperative management plans which include fishing and bird hunting
regulations.”90 The board is composed of a mix of tribal and state representatives
and has the authority to establish technical committees to develop and recommend
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regulatory approaches.91 Once the joint board adopts proposed regulations, those
proposals are forwarded to both the CKST Tribal Council and Montana Fish and
Wildlife Commission for final approval and adoption.92
The agreement includes specifics regarding enforcement of duly adopted hunting
and fishing regulations as well as licensing procedures for authorizing individuals to
hunt and fish on the Flathead Reservation.93 The enforcement procedures include
cross-deputization of tribal and state wildlife officers and provide further
opportunities for collaborative training and cross-jurisdictional support.94 Those
procedures dictate standards for uniform regulatory enforcement and require the
citation of tribal members and any violations occurring on Indian lands into tribal
court, while alleged violations committed by non-members on non-Indian lands are
cited into state court.95 Any revenues generated by either license fees or
enforcement actions are then deposited with the CSKT and earmarked for their fish
and wildlife conservation program.96
Importantly, neither the CSKT nor the State acknowledge any diminution of their
regulatory authority; rather, the cooperative agreement represents a bilateral
process for exercising shared authority while each party agrees to disagree about the
precise scope of its power.97 And, despite decades of litigation preceding the
cooperative agreement, it remains a solid and practical basis for workable joint
regulation of hunting and fishing across the Flathead Reservation.98
Beyond on-reservation hunting and fishing, a number of tribes also engage in the
management of off-reservation, treaty-reserved rights and resources that also
demand collaborative approaches with local states and the federal government. Of
these, the longest standing and most well-established are intertribal coalitions
organized to manage and conserve treaty-related resources in the Pacific Northwest
and Great Lakes regions. In the latter, the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife
Commission (GLIFWC) successfully negotiated and implemented a comprehensive
memorandum of understanding with the United States Forest Service in order to
provide for tribal regulatory authority and management of tribal members exercising
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their treaty rights on federal lands.99 While focused on the Tribes’ relationship with
the federal government, this agreement highlights the benefit of an inter-tribal
approach to addressing the management of shared resources and, as with the CSKTMontana cooperative agreement, demonstrates the potential to avoid or curtail
lengthy litigation if the parties are interested in agreeing upon “shared principles and
… clearly defined processes for joint decision-making and conflict resolution.”100

Water and Water Rights.
Tribal water rights in Oklahoma pose a significant and unresolved issue that existed
prior to and regardless of McGirt. In its 2012 Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan,
for example, the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB) recommended that, in
order “[t]o address uncertainties relating to the water rights claims by the Tribal
Nations of Oklahoma and to effectively apply the prior appropriation doctrine in the
fair apportionment of state waters, the Oklahoma Governor and State Legislature
should establish a formal consultation process as outlined” by a comprehensive
report on the tribal water rights issues compiled by Professor Lindsay Robertson of
the University of Oklahoma College of Law.101 The opening paragraph of that tribal
issues report aptly summarizes the issues, which, despite the OWRB’s 2012
recommendation, remain mostly unaddressed:
As well- and long-recognized by the State of Oklahoma, the presence
in the state of almost 40 federally-recognized tribal governments,
some or all of which may have valid, federally-enforceable, treatybased claims to water, has resulted in uncertainty with regard to
issues relating to ownership of and jurisdiction over water within the
State’s geographic limits. These claims arise primarily from alleged
reserved rights recognized in treaties between the tribes and the
United States. Although no such rights have been judicially found to
exist in Oklahoma, such rights have been recognized by federal
99
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courts in litigation in other states, and tribes in Oklahoma have
expressed confidence that their federal treaties would similarly be
found to incorporate reserved water rights. Advocates for the Five
Nations (the Cherokee Nation, the Chickasaw Nation, the Choctaw
Nation, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, and the Seminole Nation) have
made the related argument that they have an even stronger claim
based on treaty provisions granting those Nations their lands in fee
simple. Like the Oklahoma tribal reserved rights claims, this claim
has not been fully litigated.102
Thus, while the formal recognition of the Five Tribes’ reservation boundaries does
not directly impact the existence of or strength of the Tribes’ claims to water rights
associated with the treaties that established those reservations in the first place, the
resolution of those claims and the potential for expanded tribal management and
protection of water resources could be considered in the context of other postMcGirt developments. In fact, the discussion and work to resolve these issues could
form an important basis on which to work toward solutions in other areas that do
result from McGirt. In that instance, the assessment and balance of tribal and state
regulatory authority described in the preceding contexts of environmental and
natural resource regulation will be useful; however, with regard to water resources,
the basis for those authorities may differ because of the strong but yet unresolved
treaty-based claims to water rights described by Professor Robertson. The existence
and resolution of these claims will therefore likely require a slightly different
approach than those pursued in other regulatory arenas.
The series of treaties through which the Five Tribes reserved lands in what is now
Oklahoma provide the foundation for tribal claims to water and, as confirmed by the
United States Supreme Court,103 a basis on which the Five Tribes may assert
ownership rights in lands underlying waterways traversing their reservations.
Traditionally, tribal water rights are analyzed according United States v. Winters, a
1908 case in which the Supreme Court recognized that the federal government’s
setting aside of lands for tribal nations also effectuates the reservation of
appurtenant water rights sufficient to fulfill the purposes of those reservations.104
But, while recognizing those rights, the Winters decision left the details of their
quantification, scope, and extent unaddressed.
The unique history of the Five Tribes’ land is distinct from the issues resolved in
Winters, primarily because the United States guaranteed to the Tribes their land in
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fee status, never to become part of any state.105 Therefore, the Tribes acquired not
only implied rights to water under Winters but potentially actual ownership of all of
the water as well.106 This history flips the Winters analysis on its head because, as
noted by Professor Taiawagi Helton, “the question is not, How much water was
reserved in the tribes? but how much water has been taken away? …[a] shift [that]
transfers the burden of establishing a right to water from the tribes to the state.”107
The subsequent history of allotment and dispossession of those tribal lands may
complicate the assessment of the Five Tribes rights to water but, if, as in McGirt,108
that assessment relies on the foundational rules of federal Indian law such as
requiring express Congressional action to divest tribes of their property and
interests, these tribal rights remain valid.109
In addition to providing a solid basis for the Five Tribes’ claims to water rights, the
history of treaties and land ownership of the Five Tribes also supports broad tribal
authority over the management and protection of those waters. As mentioned
above, the United States Supreme Court confirmed tribal ownership of certain
submerged lands underlying navigable waterways within their reservation
boundaries in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma.110 That ownership marks an additional
critical distinction for the Five Tribes’ rights as the United States Supreme Court
relied on the ownership of similar submerged lands by the State of Montana to limit
tribal regulatory authority over non-tribal members in those areas.111 Therefore, in
addition to ownership-based claims to water, the Five Tribes may also be able to
assert broader sovereign control of those resources, including property-based rights
to exclude or condition entry upon submerged lands.112
Notwithstanding the potential strength of these claims as a legal matter, however,
successfully adjudicating and vindicating them may present significant challenges.
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First, water resources in Oklahoma are limited to two main river basins and access
to groundwater.113 These limited sources increase the likelihood of competition for
water resources, even among the Five Tribes, and demand a comprehensive and
nuanced understanding of hydrology in order to identify existing claims, uses, and
capacity. Given those limits, the State of Oklahoma is likely to assert various
arguments in opposition to the assertion of broad tribal claims to water or water
management.114 While the 2012 Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan suggests a
softening of potential State opposition to tribal claims, earlier plans relied on an
outdated misunderstanding of the status of Indian reservations within the State’s
boundaries.115 Similarly, the State initially stridently opposed efforts of the
Chickasaw and Choctaw efforts to protect their water resources but, ultimately, the
parties were able to reach a comprehensive settlement of those tribal claims.116
Furthermore, despite the legitimacy of tribal legal claims, the State’s practical
reliance upon existing uses and claims to water rights and water management may
present further barriers to the Five Tribes actually securing the full extent of their
claims. The United States Supreme Court seems particularly sensitive to these
concerns,117 however, in the context of federal and tribal reserved water rights, the
federal government has also traditionally deferred to state policies, interests, and
laws.118 Therefore, in addition to adjudicating their legal claims to water, the Five
Tribes may also consider non-litigated solutions to securing appropriate rights to
water and water management. The following lessons and examples may be useful in
those efforts.
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Closest to home is the example offered by the 2016 settlement agreement regarding
the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations’ efforts to protect the waters of their
homelands. Through that agreement, each Nation was able to secure defined rights
to access and use water and confirm the rights of individual tribal allottees to certain
water resources as well.119 In addition, the parties committed to greater involvement
and collaboration on future water planning efforts in recognition of their shared
interests in the region’s resources.120 To reach that agreement required some
compromises, however, including the waiver by the United States and the Nations
of their rights to assert certain claims regarding rights to water or water
management.121
Similar settlement agreements abound across Indian Country and many tribes,
states, and the United States have hammered out mutually beneficial resolutions of
long-standing and conflicting claims to water resources.122 Key to those
arrangements has been a solid foundation on which each party can assert, assess,
and negotiate its interests in the context of competing claims and priorities. As
Professor Robertson noted in his 2011 recommendations, various models for such
negotiations could be considered and he specifically mentioned the way in which
these matters were negotiated in the State of Montana.123 There, the State
established a reserved water rights compact commission and charged it with
identifying, negotiating, and resolving tribal and federal claims to reserved water
rights.124 The result has been the slow, but steady, securing of agreements with each
of the Tribes in Montana as well as the resolution of claims by the United States.125
Of these, the most recent agreement is the compact entered into between the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT) and the State of Montana.126 Like
the Chickasaw and Choctaw Settlement, to secure agreement from Montana and the
federal government, the CSKT waived their claims to extensive water rights in
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exchange for defined and certain water rights.127 In addition, however, the CSKT
compact also provides for unitary administration and management of on-reservation
water rights by a joint tribal-state entity.128 Like the tribal-state wildlife commission
described above, this arrangement cements a critical platform for continuing tribalstate cooperation in the oversight and regulation of the water resources shared on
the reservation by tribal and non-tribal citizens.
The Five Tribes may seek to pursue other approaches for asserting and protecting
their water resources as well. Even where their rights to water have not yet been
adjudicated or quantified, the Tribes may seek to exert broader legal and regulatory
control over water management. The legal basis for claiming such control, rooted in
tribal claims to ownership of both water and submerged lands and cemented by the
treaty history described above, could provide a broader and stronger foundation
than the limitations posed by the Montana framework.129 Even then, however, there
may still be important qualifying factors on such tribal authority. On the Colville
Indian Reservation in Washington, for example, the Confederated Tribes there have
secured judicial confirmation of their rights to water and the authority to regulate
those resources.130 The Tribes have adopted a tribal code governing permitting and
use of those waters by all (tribal and non-tribal) citizens.131
Similarly, in August 2019, the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians adopted a tribal
ordinance governing the permitting and use of groundwater in order to protect and
manage those precious resources.132 The adoption of that tribal regulatory structure
followed the Band’s victory in securing the recognition of their reserved rights to
groundwater and, in adopting the tribal ordinance, the Band sought to apply it
broadly to anyone, tribal member or not, “producing or desiring to produce”
groundwater appurtenant to the Band’s Reservation.133 In doing so, the Band
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expressly found that non-members producing groundwater on the Reservation had
consented and were therefore subject to the Band’s regulatory jurisdiction.134
But, while these broad assertions of tribal regulatory authority over water resources
may be rooted in reasonable application of relevant legal standards, Professor
Robert T. Anderson cautions that, “Tribes in similar situations [to the Colville Tribes]
will need to take seriously the need to accord some respect to state water-rightholders.”135 If prior conflicts over tribal resources and authority in Oklahoma are any
indication, efforts by the Five Tribes to unilaterally assert broader regulatory power
over water resources within their Reservations are likely to be countered by stiff
opposition from the State and its allies. Therefore, another potential path forward is
offered by Professor Robertson’s recommendations to the OWRB, which were
adopted in the 2012 Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan:
1. That the State determine who within state government has the
authority to approve a process for negotiation of water rights issues
with tribes, who within state government has the authority to conduct
such negotiations, and what the approval process is once negotiations
are complete.
2. That the State assemble a team fully authorized to meet with tribal
representatives to devise a process for the discussion and resolution of
tribal water rights claims.
3. That upon the determination of process, the State appoint a fully
authorized negotiating team to begin discussions with tribal
representatives.
4. That upon the conclusion of negotiations (either individual, group or
otherwise, as determined by the process planners), the results be
submitted for such State approval as is required.
5. That the State consider the implementation of regular consultation
protocols.136
While those recommendations focus on actions that the State of Oklahoma should
take to consider addressing the Five Tribes rights to water, pursuing the
establishment of a solid state-tribal forum in which these (and other) issues could be
effectively broached, addressed, and ideally resolved, may be an important next step
for the Five Tribes to consider. While the McGirt decision is prompting such
134
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discussion across a range of policy matters, issues of water rights and management
present a unique opportunity in that they were identified well before McGirt was
decided and there is already a record of some success in reaching a collaborative
path forward.

Conclusion.
The leaders of the Five Tribes and other policy-makers in eastern Oklahoma are faced
with a wide range of options for addressing the post-McGirt world. Each strategic
decision will need to weigh the risks, costs, and benefits of these approaches, which
may vary from strident, unilateral assertions of sovereign authority to a more passive
maintenance of (mostly state-dominated) status quo ante. With regard to regulation
and protection of the environment, natural resources, and water of the region, these
policy-makers must wrestle with each of these challenges in a highly contentious
context, made more difficult by the shared and transitory nature of those subjects.
Hopefully, this briefing paper can help support and inform those decisions by
providing useful background and context along with lessons and examples of how
others addressed similar challenges in other settings.
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